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Abstract 
Background: Cambodia has been reconstructing its economy and health sector since the end of conflict in the 
1990s. There have been gains in life expectancy and increased health expenditure, but Cambodia still lags behind 
neighbours One factor which may contribute is the efficiency of public health services. This article aims to understand 
variations in efficiency and the extent to which changes in efficiency are associated with key health policies that have 
been introduced to strengthen access to health services over the past decade.
Methods: The analysis makes use of data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure relative efficiency and changes in 
productivity and regression analysis to assess the association with the implementation of health policies. Data on 28 
operational districts were obtained for 2008–11, focussing on the five provinces selected to represent a range of con-
ditions in Cambodia. DEA was used to calculate efficiency scores assuming constant and variable returns to scale and 
Malmquist indices to measure productivity changes over time. This analysis was combined with qualitative findings 
from 17 key informant interviews and 19 in-depth interviews with managers and staff in the same provinces.
Results: The DEA results suggest great variation in the efficiency scores and trends of scores of public health services 
in the five provinces. Starting points were significantly different, but three of the five provinces have improved effi-
ciency considerably over the period. Higher efficiency is associated with more densely populated areas. Areas with 
health equity funds in Special Operating Agency (SOA) and non-SOA areas are associated with higher efficiency. The 
same effect is not found in areas only operating voucher schemes. We find that the efficiency score increased by 0.12 
the year any of the policies was introduced.
Conclusions: This is the first study published on health district productivity in Cambodia. It is one of the few stud-
ies in the region to consider the impact of health policy changes on health sector efficiency. The results suggest that 
the recent health financing reforms have been effective, singly and in combination. This analysis could be extended 
nationwide and used for targeting of new initiatives. The finding of an association between recent policy interven-
tions and improved productivity of public health services is relevant for other countries planning similar health sector 
reforms.
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Background
Since the end of the conflict in Cambodia, Gross Domes-
tic Product per capita has increased from $316 US in 
1996 to $946 US in 2012 [1]. Health expenditure has also 
risen from $23 US per capita in 1996 to $69 US in 2012 
[2]. The life expectancy of Cambodians has improved, 
rising from 54 to 61  years for men and 58 to 64  years 
for women over 2000–2008 [3]. The maternal mortality 
ratio has fallen from 690 to 290 while the infant mortal-
ity rate has declined from 95 to 45 deaths per 1000 live 
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births over the period of 2000–2010 [4, 5]. Despite these 
improvements, outcomes remain inferior to other Asian 
countries particularly given that health spending per cap-
ita is one of the highest in the region [6].
In an attempt to increase access to health services and 
improve health outcomes, the government established 
the operational district (OD) as a focus for health ser-
vices in 1996. ODs grouped existing administrative dis-
tricts to form a network of health centres and referral 
hospitals covering between 100,000 and 200,000 people. 
Services, staffing requirements and management systems 
were defined by operational guidelines with the aim of 
promoting universal coverage across the country [7, 8]. 
Achievement of universal health coverage is dependent 
on the effective performance of the OD with adequate 
resources [9].
To improve their effectiveness, a number of health 
development initiatives have been introduced over the 
period with the aim of increasing motivation of health 
workers and utilisation of facilities, particularly in rural 
areas. Demand-side schemes to remove access barriers 
to the poor have been introduced since the mid-1990s, 
including formalising charges in public facilities (1996), 
Community-based Health Insurance (CBHI) in 1998; 
Health Equity Funds (HEF), a subsidy system to increase 
access for poor people in 2000 [10–12]; and the govern-
ment National Midwifery Incentive Scheme (NMIS) and 
vouchers for deliveries, both in 2007 [13]. Income from 
demand-side schemes are pooled into the facility rev-
enues and largely used to provide salary supplement for 
staff and administrative operating costs [14]. Supply-side 
mechanisms have also been introduced to strengthen 
human resource and facility management, including 
contracting-in and out of health management and ser-
vice delivery working with international NGO operators 
between 1999 and 2002, a hybrid contracting imple-
mented between 2003 and 2008, and internal contracting 
in form of Special Operating Agencies (SOA) since 2009 
[9].
SOAs are ODs which are assessed as having met the 
capacity criteria and which are therefore granted greater 
autonomy over financial and other resources. The Min-
istry of Health and Provincial Health Departments com-
mission services from them, which are funded through 
Service Delivery Grant (SDG) backed by donor pooled 
funds. The performance based contracting is based on 
planned outputs and staff performance indicators. SOAs 
have been adopted and scaled up from 11 ODs in 2009 
to 22 ODs out of a total of 77 in 2012. The SOA roll-
out has been supported by pooled funds from seven 
donors, including the World Bank, DFID, AUSAID, 
UNFPA, UNICEF, ADB and BTC [15]. With their ability 
to scale up financial incentives and adopt results-based 
management, utilisation of public health facilities was 
expected to increase and become more efficient. How-
ever, increasing productivity of public health services and 
improvement of OD operations through adopting and 
taking ownership of those health development initiatives 
remains very much debated. So far little attention has 
been paid to assessing the change in overall productiv-
ity of ODs and its determinants. That is the focus of this 
article.
The analysis was undertaken as part of a research 
programme examining health system reconstruction 
post-conflict, within which one component focussed 
specifically on the changing incentive environment for 
health workers, including changing productivity [16]. We 
use data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric 
technique for estimating a production frontier which has 
been extensively used across public and private sectors 
to assess relative efficiency of individual firms and indus-
tries [17]. The method has been used widely in the health 
sector in high and low income countries. DEA has been 
used to investigate the efficiency of inpatient care across a 
range of countries including Costa Rica, Namibia, Kenya 
and Zambia [18–21]. Less use has been made of the tech-
nique at the primary care level, although there have been 
studies in Zambia, Sierra Leone and Pakistan [22–24]. 
Little use has been made of the technique to analyse effi-
ciency of services across a network of facilities and there 
appear to be no published studies from Cambodia. In 
most cases, studies focus on outputs from health care 
including inpatient-days, outpatients and, rarely, patients 
treated adjusted for diagnosis. Second stage analysis to 
analyse the impact of contextual variables such as facility 
ownership, socio-economic conditions and geography is 
frequently carried out. There appear to be few attempts 
to use DEA to understand the association between 
specific health reforms and changes in efficiency. Our 
article therefore adds both to understanding of produc-
tivity in Cambodia and also extends the use of the DEA 
methodology.
Methods
This article assesses the determinants of productivity of 
OD services in five provinces. The analysis makes use 
of data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure the effi-
ciency of each operational district in utilising resources 
to produce health services relative to other areas. The 
productivity of operational districts, defined as changes 
in efficiency over time, is analysed using a Malmquist 
total factor productivity index. Efficiency estimates are 
analysed by Tobit regression to assess the association 
with the implementation of health policies.
DEA has a number of advantages over regression-based 
techniques such as stochastic frontier analysis, including 
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not having to specify a functional form for the produc-
tion function and permitting the modelling of multi-
ple outputs. The main weakness of the method is that, 
unlike stochastic regression methods, there is no test of 
significance and so no guide to the quality of results. It 
is suggested that it be used principally as an exploratory 
tool “rather than as an instrument with which to extract 
precise estimates of organisational efficiency” [25]. As 
with many quantitative measures of efficiency, the anal-
ysis makes no allowance for the quality or outcome of 
the outputs. It could be the case, for example, that those 
facilities that deliver lower value in terms of outputs per 
input(s) may be delivering a higher quality service that 
leads to better patient outcomes.
The focus of the study is the operational district over 
a period of 4  years from 2008 to 2011. This period was 
defined by data availability but includes a period when 
many of the reform initiatives described earlier were 
being introduced (see Table  1). Data on 28 operational 
districts were obtained, focussing on the five provinces 
that are representative of a range of conditions in Cam-
bodia (geographic conditions, urban/rural populations, 
and also different levels of external investment). Phnom 
Penh was included in the wider study but removed from 
this analysis because of the gaps in information on staff-
ing and limited participation in key informant interviews 
(Table 2).
For the DEA, DMUs are defined as operational dis-
tricts. Each DMU is observed four times, providing panel 
data that can be used to assess productivity across the 
years and understand the impact of policy. Operational 
districts are treated as multi-product units producing 
a range of health services. The main services (outputs) 
were specified as numbers of inpatient-days, outpatients 
and deliveries. Inpatient days and outpatients provide a 
general measure of overall workload while deliveries are 
included because of the policy priority placed on increas-
ing facility births. Data for outputs were drawn from 
national health statistics, which have been managed elec-
tronically since 2008.
Data on inputs were available on staffing numbers by 
type (doctors, secondary nurses, primary nurses, second-
ary midwives, primary midwives and other staff) and the 
non-staffing recurrent expenditure (Table 3). Staff num-
bers are collapsed into three categories: doctors, nurses 
& midwives and other staff. Inputs and outputs at facility 
Table 1 Coverage of health initiatives in target provinces and ODs
Source: MoH Updated Administrative Records
a In Battambang, delivery vouchers started in 2008 in three ODs and building up HEF experiences started in 2006 for some health centres in three ODs to scale up 
implementation for all five ODs in 2011
b Two OD in Kampot (Angkor Chey, Kampong Trach and Kampot) started HEF in 2006/2008 and two ODs (KschaKandal and Takhmao) in Kandal since 2006/7 are 
supported by MoH, while the rest are supported by donor funds; the starting data of the HEF is between 2005 to 2011
OD Delivery vouchersa User fees formalised HEF/CBHI National maternity 
incentives scheme
Contracting-in and out SOA (SDG)
2012 1997–2011 2012 2007–present 1999–2003 2004–2008 2009–2010
Battambanga 5 3 5 5 5
Kompong Cham 10 9 10 10 10 5 5 5
Kandalb 8 0 8 2 8
Kompotb 4 3 4 3 4
Stung Treng 1 0 1 1 1
Table 2 Characteristics of selected areas
Source: document review for policies; NIS and MOP, 2009 for population data
Ecological region Province No. of ODs No. of RHs No. of HCs Total population Characteristics
1. Plain Phnom Penh 4 5 17 1,327,615 Urban; high level external 
partner support
2. Plain Kandal 8 6 94 1,265,280 Rural; unsupported by partners
3. Plain Kampong Cham 10 11 136 1,679,992 Rural; supported by partners
4. Tonle sap Battambang 5 4 76 1,025,174 Rural; supported by partners
5. Coastal Kampot 4 4 50 585,850 Rural; supported by partners
6. Plateau and mountainous Stung Treng 1 1 11 111,671 Rural; supported by partners
Total for the country 77 80 292 13,395,682
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level are aggregated to operational districts, which are 
the unit of analysis for the quantitative analysis. Expendi-
ture data were missing for Kompot region and we there-
fore estimated efficiency for the full sample (108 data 
points) without expenditure and a restricted sample with 
expenditure (92 data points without Kompot).
The linear programming technique of Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA) is used to obtain output oriented 
estimates of production efficiency across operational 
districts. For constant returns to scale DEA solves the 
optimisation problem by maximising, for DMU (1), the e 
weighted (Wr) sum of N outputs (Or):
and subject to the constraint that the sum of the weighted 
Sum of M inputs is equal to one (to avoid an infinite 
number of solutions):
and ensuring that all P DMUs have efficiency indices less 
than or equal to one:
There is no reason to assume the all operational dis-
tricts will be operating at optimal scale and so both varia-
ble (VRS) as well as constant returns to scale (CRS) DEA 
efficiency scores are computed. While CRS assumes that 
n∑
r=1
WrOr1, whereWr ≥ 0,
m∑
i=1
ViIi1 = 1,
n∑
r=1
WrOrj −
m∑
i=1
ViIij ≤ 0j = 1, . . .P.
an increase in inputs will increase outputs in the same 
proportion, VRS allows for a disproportionate change.
The data on operational districts is available for 4 years 
forming a balanced panel that permits consideration of the 
change in productivity over years. A Malmquist Productiv-
ity Index (MPI) is used for this purpose [25]. This provides 
a measure of the change in efficiency for each operational 
district from year to year. It is specified as the geometric 
mean of the index in each year. For DMU (1) this is:
for all inputs (I) and outputs (O). A decomposition shows 
that the MPI is the product of changes associated with 
improvements in the technical efficiency of individual 
operational districts (getting closer to the industry fron-
tier) and efficiency changes related to technical progress 
in the industry (technological efficiency resulting in a 
shift in the production frontier):
An index (total or individual components) of more than 
one indicates positive growth from 1 year to the next an 
index less than one indicates negative growth.
DEA and MPI estimates were obtained using the Data 
Envelopment Analysis Programme (DEAP) developed by 
Coelli [26]. This accepts data formatted as text files struc-
tured with columns outputs and then input. Changes 
MPI1,t+1 =
[
dt1(It+1,Ot+1)
dt1(It ,Ot)
×
dt+11 (It+1,Ot+1)
dt+11 (It ,Ot)
]0.5
MPI1,t+1 =
d
t+1
1 (It+1,Ot+1)
d
t
1(It ,Ot)
×
[
d
t
1(It+1,Ot+1)
d
t+1
1 (It+1,Ot+1)
×
d
t
1(It ,Ot)
d
t+1
1 (It ,Ot)
]0.5
Table 3 Average staffing in each operational district
Other medical staff include pharmacists, pharmacist assistances and medical and dental assistants
Battambang Kampang Cham Kampot Kandal Stung Treng
2008
 Doctors 6.8 6.0 8.3 11.4 10.0
 Secondary nurse 62.2 37.2 42.8 21.6 59.0
 Primary nurse 37.0 21.0 28.0 20.1 65.0
 Secondary midwife 32.4 10.6 14.8 9.1 31.0
 Primary midwife 19.2 12.1 15.8 11.8 42.0
 Other medical staff 14.0 6.8 6.5 7.4 11.0
2011
 Doctors 5.8 6.6 9.5 12.4 9.0
 Secondary nurse 62.0 37.8 41.3 22.9 68.0
 Primary nurse 36.4 23.4 32.3 18.0 67.0
 Secondary midwife 34.8 11.3 19.8 11.4 30.0
 Primary midwife 23.0 19.8 22.3 15.8 50.0
 Other medical staff 14.2 5.9 5.8 6.6 7.0
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in efficiency can be explored further by attempting to 
understand the association between the score and possi-
ble determinants such as population density and poverty 
levels. Associations with the quality of the output (out-
comes) can also be undertaken if data are available, which 
was not the case for this dataset. The results have, how-
ever, been triangulated with the qualitative data obtained 
from health mangers through key informant interviews 
(KII) and health workers consulted during the in-depth 
interviews (IDI), in order to contextualise and under-
stand explanatory factors behind the quantitative results. 
Seventeen KIIs and 19 IDIs were conducted across five 
provinces between August and December 2013, using a 
semi-structure interview guide. Transcripts were ana-
lysed thematically [27]. Ethical approval was provided by 
the study by the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine 
and the National Ethical Committee for Health Research 
of the Ministry of Health in Cambodia in 2012. Informed 
consent was provided by all participating health staff and 
managers.
The association between the DEA productivity index 
(with and without expenditure) and the presence of 
major health financing policies—health equity funds, 
vouchers and special operating areas—was also investi-
gated. The index is bounded between zero and one (left 
and right censoring) and this truncation means that OLS 
estimators are inconsistent. Instead a random effects 
Tobit model, which provides consistent regression coeffi-
cients, is used to estimate the two specifications. The first 
regression explores the association between policies and 
productivity (E) as follows:
Where t is annual dummy variable, Psit are a series of 
dummy variables representing the main health financ-
ing policy combinations, D is the population density 
and A is regional dummy variable. The random effects 
model leads to a combination error term where ust is a 
district/time effect and vi an observation specific effect. 
A positive association suggests that areas with higher 
productivity are associated with the presence of health 
policies. It is, however, difficult to attribute causation 
since it is not possible to tell whether those areas with 
more productive services are more likely to be chosen to 
implement new financing policies. A second regression, 
attempts to look at whether the introduction of financ-
ing policies was associated with a change in productivity 
as follows:
where Posi is district specific variable for the main financ-
ing policies (HEF) and Vouchers and Pnit is a time/dis-
trict specific dummy variable for the introduction of 
Eit = α0 + α1t + α2Psit + α3Di + α4Ai + ust + vi
Eit = β0 + β1t + β2P
o
si + β3P
n
it + β4Di + β5Ai + ust + vi
any major new financing policy. Significant association 
makes a causal link more likely although it still may have 
been possible for another variable to have improved both 
productivity and the introduction of health financing 
polices. The productivity DEA variable is constrained to 
take a value of between zero and one.
Results and discussion
Utilisation of public health services in each province has 
increased over the 4 year period, as indicated by increas-
ing trends in outpatients and number of new cases (aggre-
gated in Fig. 1). The DEA results suggest great variation in 
the efficiency scores and trends of scores of public health 
services across the five provinces (Figs. 2, 3; detailed OD 
figures are provided in Additional file 1: Web Annex S1). 
Starting points were significantly different, but three of 
the five provinces have improved efficiency considerably 
over the period. Stung Treng remains a low performer 
throughout. These results are reinforced by the MPI esti-
mates of productivity change (Table  4). These show low 
positive or negative productivity growth in Stung Treng 
while there is a strong and consistent improvement in 
productivity in other provinces, notably Battambang. The 
decompositions suggest that changes in productivity are 
evenly split between technical progress across the sector 
and improvements in individual efficiency resulting from 
economies of scale and better use of inputs.
It is perhaps not surprising that Kampong Cham, 
which is the only one of the provinces in this group to 
have been given SOA status, was one of the most efficient 
performers at the start and has increased its performance 
over the period (though less significantly if expenditures 
are taken into account, reflecting perhaps the higher 
payments which SOA areas receive). Five of its ten ODs 
have been given SOA status since 2009, which reflected 
its existing capacity. It also implemented the full range of 
demand- and supply-side stimuli (Table  1). It recorded 
the highest productivity growth throughput the period 
including between 2010 and 2011 when growth dipped 
for other provinces.
Kandal province, which has only implemented user 
fee formalisation on the demand side in an earlier phase 
and the midwifery incentive scheme in this phase across 
its ODs, and has had less external support as a province, 
nevertheless maintained a comparable efficiency to Kam-
pang Cham, especially once expenditures are included 
(Fig.  2). Battambang started implementing delivery 
vouchers for three ODs in 2008 and scaled up health 
equity funds, staring in 2006 and reaching full implemen-
tation in all five ODs in 2011. It shows a robust increase 
in OD productivity, noted by a sharp raise of both effi-
ciency scores with and without expenditures over the 
4 year period.
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The productivity of public health services in Kampot 
appears to level off and growth is negative between 2010 
and 2011. The change in productivity is likely to come 
from the recent financial incentive schemes (vouchers, 
user fees, HEF/CBHI and NMIS) supported by govern-
ment and donors funds to the ODs in Kampot Province 
(Table 1).
Among the five provinces, Stung Treng province shows 
the poorest performance, indicated by a stagnation of 
efficiency scores and low productivity growth, both with 
and without expenditures. This is likely to result from 
local conditions, as the area is mountainous and access to 
health services is constrained by poor roads, low popu-
lation density and dispersed settlements of Cambodian 
ethnic minorities.
The regression analysis enables investigation of the 
association between performance and policy implemen-
tation. Each model was estimated with the CRS and VRS 
efficiency estimates, with and without expenditure as an 
input variable. Results reported here are for the entire 
sample and so exclude expenditure but similar results 
were found for the sub-sample that includes expendi-
ture. The first model investigates the association between 
policy combinations and area covariates for both DEA 
indices with and without health spending (Table 5). Effi-
ciency appears to increase over time (compared to the 
base year of 2008). In the CRS model, population density 
is associated with higher productivity, possibly reflect-
ing the difficulty of reaching services for more remote 
populations. Areas with health equity funds in SOA and 
non-SOA areas are associated with higher productiv-
ity. The same effect is not found in areas only operating 
voucher schemes. The effect of the health equity funds 
are not found to be statistically significant in the VRS 
model, suggesting that lower efficiency in areas with-
out equity funds is largely due to the facilities operating 
below optimum scale. The stimulus in use of service due 
to health equity funds helps facilities to achieve scale 
economies. The disappearance of a significant association 
with the densest populated areas is likely due to a similar 
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mechanism (with facilities more able to achieve scale 
economies in highly populated areas).
The second model (Table 6) attempts to disentangle the 
underlying association with financing schemes and any 
additional effect arising from the introduction of these 
schemes. Both CRS and VRS specifications suggest an 
increase in efficiency following the introduction of any or 
a combination of the three main policies; the efficiency 
score increases by between 0.11 and 0.12 the year any of 
the policies was introduced. It is notable that the poli-
cies have an impact in both CRS and VRS specifications. 
This suggests that the policies have an impact that goes 
beyond heavier utilisation of services resulting from the 
stimulus to demand.
Explaining differences across ODs and provinces
It is unsurprising that population density emerges as a 
significant determinant of efficiency. Of the study prov-
inces, Kandal and Kampong Cham had the highest popu-
lation density in 2008, at 302 and 164 persons per square 
kilometre respectively [28] and the highest population to 
health worker (doctor, nurse and midwife) ratio of 1560 
started with highest efficiency scores at around 0.8 in 
2008. By contrast, Battambang province with 88 persons 
per square kilometre and 833 persons per health worker 
began at around 0.54 scores (Fig.  1). Stung Treng, with 
the lowest population density of 10 persons per square 
kilometre and 518 persons per health worker, had the 
lowest productivity among the five provinces.
Net immigration of population [29] seems to be asso-
ciated with the rise of efficiency scores in the case of 
Kompong Cham between 2008 and 2011, Kompot for the 
period of 2008–2010, and Kandal province between 2010 
and 2011. Population movement from other parts of the 
country is cited by the health managers of the hospitals 
and health centres as one factor in increasing demand.
For Stung Treng, at least two additional factors besides 
dispersed population and difficulty of access to the health 
facilities may have played a part in the region’s relatively 
low performance. First, there is less demand for health 
care among indigenous population who had limited 
knowledge of the importance of health care, and largely 
still used traditional midwives or healers, according to 
the health managers consulted, despite an increase in 
quality of health care and increased availability of ser-
vices at the health facilities. Lack of trust in the public 
health service is another factor which was highlighted. 
Strung Treng is one of the least developed provinces in 
Cambodia, and is not favoured by the health workers. If 
they accept a posting there, according to our interviews, 
Table 4 Malmquist index and decomposition (with and without expenditure as an input)
Without expenditure With expenditure
2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 Mean 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 Mean
Marmquist productivity index
 Battambang 1.400 1.390 1.073 1.248 1.285 1.392 1.092 1.219
 Kampang Cham 1.233 1.190 0.938 1.091 1.180 1.190 0.924 1.068
 Kampot 1.242 1.193 0.916 1.053
 Kandal 1.046 1.126 0.998 1.042 1.019 1.075 1.028 1.025
 Stung Treng 0.817 1.106 1.170 1.019 0.689 1.020 1.170 0.937
 Total 1.175 1.233 0.974 1.092 1.128 1.186 1.004 1.080
Technical progress in sector
 Battambang 1.167 1.149 1.087 1.127 1.123 1.139 1.057 1.100
 Kampang Cham 1.149 1.075 0.977 1.058 1.109 1.049 0.969 1.035
 Kampot 0.978 1.046 0.930 0.975
 Kandal 1.137 1.042 0.937 1.033 1.079 1.015 0.959 1.014
 Stung Treng 0.909 1.243 0.957 1.026 0.872 1.025 1.024 0.971
 Total 1.121 1.095 0.985 1.059 1.092 1.055 0.987 1.039
Technical efficiency change
 Battambang 1.170 1.244 0.986 1.109 1.111 1.256 1.033 1.110
 Kampang Cham 1.074 1.112 0.957 1.032 1.072 1.140 0.949 1.033
 Kampot 1.289 1.183 0.984 1.082
 Kandal 0.922 1.083 1.063 1.009 0.949 1.060 1.071 1.011
 Stung Treng 0.899 0.890 1.223 0.993 0.790 0.996 1.143 0.965
 Total 1.045 1.137 0.989 1.031 1.027 1.132 1.015 1.039
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they do it just to complete the probationary period, and 
most of them, except the ones who are from this prov-
ince, then ask for transfers to work elsewhere, or else they 
remain working in the provincial town of Stung Treng 
[27]. The young profile of staff in the province may cause 
a lack of confidence by households, and facilities such 
as ambulances for referral are reported in interviews as 
lacking.
“…It is difficult for us due to our age and experience 
in maternal health care. We don’t get much trust 
from the customers or patients. Customers always 
complained about our HC to let young midwives 
with less experience to treat them, especially when 
the problem happens…” (STIDI1)
In some areas, like Battambang, there is a thriving pri-
vate sector which draws customers away from public 
facilities, which are perceived to offer lower quality.
On the supply side, budget disbursement and staffing 
problems can adversely affect facility functioning.
In Kompot province, for example, our interviews found 
that budget disbursement to facilities was often delayed 
and reduced. Another more general issue was mal-distri-
bution of staff and the fact that actual staffing numbers 
were lower than those officially recorded. Mal-distribu-
tion of health workers reduces efficiency. The transfer of 
qualified and experienced health workers from the least 
to the most developed areas is a widespread problem, 
which leaves the public health facilities in rural areas 
with poorly qualified staff. Thus, the regular presence of 
health workers in the public facilities may not lead to an 
increase in production of health service delivery or utili-
sation of the public health services, especially in the rural 
areas. Despite receiving financial incentives in recent 
years, including from user fees and midwifery incentives, 
as well as an automatic annual salary increase of 20  % 
since 2010/11, deploying and retaining health workers to 
work in the rural area remains a critical challenge for OD 
managers. Field visits also suggest a lack of equipment, 
especially in health centres and rural areas.
Explaining the policy effects
The recent health financing reforms have aimed to stim-
ulate supply and demand, and our results suggest that 
they have been effective, singly and in combination. 
This is compatible with results of evaluations of specific 
policies. For example, Chhun et al. found that that HEFs 
and vouchers increased health care access of the poor 
at both public and private facilities [30]. On the supply 
Table 5 Tobit regression results for OD efficiency and pol-
icy/area characteristics (CRS and  VRS, without  expendi-
ture)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
CRS VRS
Coef. z Coef. z
Year
 2009 0.08 2.24* 0.11 2.41**
 2010 0.17 4.76 0.13 2.77***
 2011 0.15 4.11*** 0.11 2.41**
Policies
 Vouchers only 0.04 0.41 −0.05 −0.40
 HEF only 0.11 1.74** −0.03 −0.40
 HEF + vouchers 0.16 2.24** 0.00 0.05
 HEF + vouchers with SOA 0.26 2.99*** 0.16 1.52
Population Density
 2 0.01 0.09 −0.02 −0.29
 3 −0.04 −0.23 −0.03 −0.18
 4 0.16 1.45** 0.09 0.74
Province
 Kampong Cham 0.16 1.88*** 0.14 1.66
 Kampot −0.19 −1.97
 Kandal 0.11 1.29*** 0.12 1.37
 Stung Treng −0.27 −1.76 −0.25 −1.62
Constant 0.46 5.45*** 0.69 7.90
 Observations 92.00 92.00
Table 6 Tobit regressions: OD productivity and additional 
effects from new scheme introduction (CRS and VRS, with-
out expenditure)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
CRS VRS
Coef. z Coef. z
Year
 2009 0.07 2.00** 0.09 2.02*
 2010 0.17 4.56*** 0.11 2.47***
 2011 0.14 3.59*** 0.09 1.85****
Policies
 Existing hef 0.06 0.87 −0.06 −0.92
 Existing vouchers 0.09 1.17 0.08 1.02
 New policy (hef,voucher, SOA) 0.114 2.41*** 0.124 2.18**
Population density
 2 −0.02 −0.30 −0.04 −0.50
 3 −0.08 −0.51 −0.05 −0.30
 4 0.17 1.47* 0.10 0.89
Province
 Kampong Cham 0.18 2.17*** 0.16 1.84*
 Kampot −0.17 −1.60* −0.14 −1.35
 Kandal 0.13 1.55 0.16 1.82*
 Stung Treng −0.19 −1.24 −0.18 −1.14
Constant
 Observations 92 – 92 –
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side, interviews with health workers and managers [27] 
also highlight that a large proportion of income col-
lected from the financial incentive schemes was used for 
increasing the income and motivation of health workers, 
as well as being used by the facility managers to make the 
service at the public facilities available for 24 h a day to 
the population.
In Kampong Cham, three factors may explain its rela-
tively higher efficiency scores. First, it has implemented 
the full range of demand-side and supply-side interven-
tions. Secondly, as an early adopter, it benefited from 
management capacity development in the early stages of 
the pilot schemes—experiences which have been shared 
among the facility managers through quarterly provin-
cial health department (PHD) meetings to improve their 
leadership and management skills, according to key 
informants. Finally, NGO support since 2000 in improv-
ing health infrastructure and supply of medical equip-
ment at facility level is thought to be in part responsible 
for increased capacity for service delivery.
Health worker explanatory factors
One of the factors behind low efficiency is the limited 
working hours of many public sector workers. From 
in-depth interviews with health workers, these are esti-
mated as varying between 3 h for well-experienced spe-
cialist doctors to 8 h for newly graduated midwife; and on 
average, the secondary level cadres are likely to spend at 
least 6 h working at their public posts.
The revenue collected from the demand side financial 
schemes is reportedly put into pooled income of the facil-
ity; and 60 % of this income is then distributed among the 
active staff. The health workers earn a supplementary 
income of around 100–150 USD per month, according to 
their level of education attainment and the types of tasks 
they accomplish, in addition to their basic salary of about 
65USD and an annual increase 20 % of basic salary from 
the government for the past 5 years [31]. However, most 
mangers and health workers argued that income from 
public services remains lower than the expenditure that 
they need to support their families. Therefore, the health 
managers felt that:
“… I cannot force my staff to work full time, although 
they receive a top up average of 100-150USD per 
month from recent incentive based payment schemes 
in addition to their salary. But it cannot off set what 
they need to spend to support their families. There-
fore, I often open one eye and close another eye when 
my staff come late at work or leave a bit early for 
making living to support their families. My task then 
is to ensure the quality of worker when the staff pre-
sent at their post…” (KCII1)
In the health sector, the health workers often need 
to do dual practice to make extra income to support 
their family. For example, renting a house costs around 
100USD per month, depending on the type of house; this 
is already higher than the average salary of a public health 
worker. The opportunity for informal practice or taking 
part time jobs is identified by most health managers as 
an important, though illegal, strategy to motivate the 
health workers to remain in their posts. One of the man-
agers estimated that dual practice has reportedly contrib-
uted about 40–50 % of staff revenues and most managers 
agreed that:
“… if we completely stop the informal practice, I am 
sure they will all have gone” (KCII2).
Low salaries reduce public sector input costs, but may 
encourage dual practice which tends to reduce public 
sector (but not necessarily overall) outputs. Unfortu-
nately, we lack trend data for overall public pay and dual 
practice over the period, to be able to disentangle effects 
on efficiency measures. However, it is important to bear 
in mind that most of health workers set up their private 
businesses (clinics) or take part-time employment at pri-
vate clinics or provided private service to their clients for 
extra income generation to support their family. A recent 
study confirmed that over 50 % of the public health work-
ers interviewed also worked in the private sector in 2012 
[32]. Overall human resource productivity will therefore 
be higher than reported here, but with additional costs to 
consumers.
In the civil code of professional conduct, public health 
workers are required to work for 8  h a day and are not 
allowed to have dual employment. In practice, the 
managers cannot enforce punctuality and stop private 
practice after-office hours, and they often report a sym-
pathetic management practice to retain key health per-
sonnel, especially the ones with technical competency. 
This management practice has resulted in positive and 
negative effects on the quality of public health service 
delivery [27]. On the positive side, it makes health care 
service available for 24 h by rotating stand-by staff, with 
urgent calls to specific health professionals if it is neces-
sary. The negative side of this sympathetic management 
practice is the diversion of clients to private clinics or 
individual home care, which affects the efficiency scores 
of most public health care services captured by this study.
Reflections on data reliability
It is important to reflect on how accurate the staffing 
numbers are and whether staff are actually working their 
official hours, both of which affect the efficiency esti-
mates. Triangulating with qualitative information sug-
gests that fewer health workers actually remain working 
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in post than officially recorded by the MoH. One of the 
in-depth interview participants working in a remote 
health centre confirmed in Stung Treng that:
…There are four staffs at this HC, but only one or two 
are active. I am working here, there is no replace-
ment. For my unit, there are only 3 staff and one is 
active while others come and go… (STIDI2).
The OD and health centre mangers report that they 
have often received the list of the names of the newly 
recruited staffs from the Ministry of Health or Provincial 
Health Department in response to the requests they have 
put forward in the human resource plan. While the list 
of personnel is officially updated, some new health work-
ers such as doctors or secondary nurses or midwifes had 
never shown up at their assigned posts, or if they do, they 
do not go regularly to their assigned posts. With inter-
ventions from the high-ranking officials and other fam-
ily connections, they then ask to be transferred to work 
elsewhere after completing 1  year of their probation 
period. In these cases, the name of those staff can remain 
in the official records for 6–12  months, before they are 
corrected.
Some experienced health workers have taken leave 
without pay from the public sector to work for NGO 
health-related programmes or private providers, and 
their names may reportedly remain in the official records. 
Such shortfalls can be addressed in areas with internal 
contracting and SOA status, but in others it is harder to 
fill these gaps, according to health manager key inform-
ants at all levels of the health system.
It should be noted too that health workers at the OD 
level also take on other activities which were not reflected 
in our efficiency analysis (such as village outreach visits), 
due to lack of data on these activities.
Conclusion
Our analysis suggests increased efficiency in most of 
the selected ODs over the period, but with substantial 
variations across the provinces. Some important limita-
tions are however noted, including data shortages, which 
reduced the number of sites and the type of analysis 
which could be conducted. Quality of care indicators 
are absent, some information (such as staffing numbers) 
may not be fully accurate, and important information is 
not included, such as working hours and public pay. Also, 
while it is innovative to aggregate inputs and outputs for 
all facilities in a health district, the results must be inter-
preted with care: by aggregating, efficient facilities will be 
fused with less efficient ones. Thus, the fact that a health 
district is inefficient does not mean that it has no efficient 
facilities. The findings do however open up a series of 
questions, which qualitative information complements. 
For example, the difficult working and access conditions 
in Stung Treng suggest that a different set of interven-
tions might be needed there to boost outputs, compared 
to other areas. Addressing efficiency requires an under-
standing of area factors, organisational level factors and 
individual supply-and demand-side factors, as well as 
interaction between public, private and informal mar-
kets. Some of these are more amenable to policy levers 
than others.
In Cambodia, this is the first study of OD productiv-
ity, and indeed it adds to a very limited body of evidence 
on health district efficiency (most studies which have 
been done in low and middle income settings have ana-
lysed the hospital as the unit of production), and on the 
impact of health sector reforms on productivity. A num-
ber of policy implications can be drawn from this study. 
For effective resource planning and monitoring purposes, 
the administrative records should be improved. It would 
also be interesting and useful to replicate the analysis 
using country-wide data sets. The results of this country-
wide analysis could be used for resource planning and 
targeting of new initiatives. The finding of an association 
between recent policy interventions and improved pro-
ductivity of public health services will also be of interest 
to other countries planning similar health sector reforms.
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